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T
he Andean approach to integration goes far beyond the typical integration scheme applied by developing countries. This is true with regard to both objectives and mechanisms of integration. Integration is understood by the Andean countries as a main vehicle to facilitate self-sustaining development and strengthen the bargaining position vis-a-vis third countries. What is more, special emphasis is laid on a balanced distribution among the member states of the benefits to be derived from integration.
Short-comings of Lafta
As far as mechanisms are concerned, the Andean countries learnt from the experiences with the Latin American Free Trade Association (Lafta)2 that mere trade liberalization tends to accentuate inter-country polarization tendencies. The main winner of trade liberalization within Lafta has been Brazil, whose share in intra-regional exports increased from 16% in 1962-64 to 26% in 1976, whereas the corresponding import share declined from 35 e/0 to 27 e/0. In contrast to this the Andean countries (including Chile) participated by 40 S/o in Lafta exports in 1976 as against 43% in 1962-64, and the subregion's share in intrazonal imports rose from 33% to 45% 3.
A second criticism raised against Lafta concerns the role of transnational corporations (TNCs) in Latin American integration, which in many cases * HWWA-Institut for Wirtschaftsforschung-Hamburg. : As of October 30, 1976 Chile had withdrawn from the Andean Pact while Venezuela has been full member of the group only since January 1, 1974. 2 Apart from the five Andean Pact countries, which are special status members, Lafta comprises Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay and Uruguay.
have affiliates with largely identical production programs in various Lafta countries 4. As a consequence the Lafta meetings on tariff reductions were often dominated by representatives of foreign subsidiaries, which in many cases belonged to the same parent company 5. This may be regarded as a main contributing factor to the slow progress of trade liberalization within Lafta since the midsixties, because established foreign companies are showing little propensity to reallocate production the more so as integration between politically unstable countries is associated with high risks. Foreign newcomers on Lafta markets, on the other hand, have a strong preference for the larger-market and more advanced countries in the region, in this way aggravating the polarization tendencies referred to above 6.
Andean Response
In response to the short-comings of Lafta the Andean Countries agreed upon a far more ambitious scheme of economic integration: [] an independent community institution with the power of proposal, the Junta, and an inter-governmental supranational institution with the power of approval, the Commission, are established.
In terms of integration theory, the Andean Pact may thus be characterized as a customs union with some degree of policy harmonization and an LDC-specific element of developmental nationalism 7. The following analysis examines the constitutive elements of the Andean integration scheme, i.e. trade liberalization, industrial programming and common treatment of foreign direct investment.
Trade Liberalization
The economic rationale underlying trade liberalization within the Andean Group is simple and evident. The domestic markets of the member countries are too small to permit plants of an efficient size to be built. In 1977 population and gross domestic product in the five Andean states were on an average only 10% of the corresponding figures for Brazil 8. The combined Andean eco-7 In addition to a customs union, which is a free trade area with a common external tariff, the Andean integration scheme contains elements of a common market, where restrictions on factor movements are abolished, and an economic union, where a considerable degree of policy harmonization is achieved. Cf. D. M o r av e t z, The Andean Group: A Case Study in Economic Integration among Developing Countries, Cambridge (Mass.) and London, 1974, p. 3. -The term "develomental nationalism" has been suggested by E. Milenky. Cf. E. M il e n k y, Developmental Nationalism in Practice: The Problems and Progress of the Andean Group, in: Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 4, 1974, pp. 49 Trade liberalization is also expected to favour a reallocation of existing industrial activities according to comparative cost advantages, the more so as a considerable scope for intra-industry specialisation among the Andean economies is said to exist, prevented from materializing only by high tariff and non-tariff barriers to subregional trade 9. This appears, however, to be a rather optimistic view given the striking similarities of industrial structures resulting from import-substitution policies, to which the Andean countries devoted themselves in the post-war area. The conditions for trade liberalization to stimulate industrial growth are, therefore, less favourable in the Andean area than, for example, in the EEC or Efta region.
The Cartagena Agreement provides that all intrazonal trade restrictions are abolished by December 31, 1980 , at the latest (Article 45). By the same date the CET would be implemented. This schedule proved, however, to be too tight. It has therefore been extended in various protocols modifying the Cartagena Agreement, the last being the Protocol of Arequipa, signed on 21st April 1978, which postponed the deadline for completing the customs union to December 31, 1989.
In spite of the delays the progress made until now in trade liberalization is considerable. According to information by the Andean Pact Junta non-tariff barriers have already been eliminated by Colombia, Peru and Venezuela for products actually traded within the subregion and not included in SPIDs, i.e. 65 % of intrazonal trade. For 70 % of these commodities tariff barriers to trade between the three countries have been reduced to between 1 and 20% , the highest tariff rate for the remaining 30 % being 38 ~ lo.
The reduction of trade barriers gave rise to the strong performance of subregional trade as evidenced in table 2. In 1968 internal exports amounted to only $ 75 mn, i.e. less than 2 % of the Andean Group's exports to third countries. Until 1977 internal exports increased to more than $ 800 mn thus exceeding by one-fourth the deliveries to the rest of Lafta and reaching nearly 6 C/o of total exports to third countries. Intratrade as % of:
total exports exports to to third countries cance of reciprocal trade in total industrial activities remains low. In Colombia, for example, which is most important in intra-Andean trade, the share of manufactured exports to the remaining Andean countries is less than 5% of the country's industrial value-added. Secondly, much will depend on the level and structure of the CET. If the latter would turn out protectionistic in such a way, that inefficient capital intensive industries are promoted, the short-comings of pre-integration national import-substitution policies might be repeated on a regional level. Moreover, the countries to suffer most from trade diversion would presumably be Bolivia and Ecuador, which do not have substantial intermediate and capital-goods industries and would thus be forced to redirect the corresponding imports from suppliers outside the subregion to more expensive intra-Andean sources.
In recent years the criteria have been redefined, according to which the CET is to be structured. technological base is also a central objective of industrial programming within the Andean Group. Above this, and even more important, industrial programming is the chief instrument to secure an equitable sharing of industrialization benefits between the member states. In the first five years of the Andean Pact, when trade liberalization was already under way while industrial programming was only on paper and in negotiation, the main beneficiary of intra-trade expansion had been Colombia which belongs to the more advanced countries in the subregion 13. Since 1973, however, Colombia's share in intrazonal exports has been stagnating, whereas especially Ecuador experienced a strong upward trend. The latter is to a certain degree probably due to overproportionate oil price increases and a preferential treatment of 
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Ecuador in trade liberalization, but may also be explained by the program for industrial development in metalworking, which is in force since August 1972.
In its final stage industrial programming is to cover nine key industrial sectors 14 and assume an overall significance amounting to 11% of subregional industrial value-added as projected by 1990 15
Of the three SPIDs adopted so far the metalworking and automobile programs appear to be more adequate from a developmental point of view than the one relating to the petrochemical industry, since the latter is highly capital intensive, provides only little scope for subregional intra-industry division of labour, and does not give rise to substantial technological spillovers to other sectors.
The metalworking and car industry program, on the other hand, may contribute significantly to job creation and the development of skills and know-14 MetaTworking, automobiles, petrochemicals, chemicaTs, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, electronics, shipbuilding, and steel. how, the use of which can spread throughout the rest of the economy 16. In addition to this, the technical nature of production and the wide range of sub-products and sub-activities in these industries, e.g. foundering, forging, machining and tooling, permit an exchange of parts and components, in which all member countries, including the small and backward ones can participate. Bolivia and Ecuador may thus, at least in theory, enjoy substantial benefits from the metalworking and automotive agreements, while in the absence of planning mechanisms these countries would possibly get nothing.
In reality, however, dissatisfaction prevails. One of two firms in Bolivia, which took up production within the metalworking program, has closed down operations in the meantime, and in both countries the assignments made in the car industry have come under heavy attack. In Ecuador, for example, 15 In the case of metalworking, automotive, electrical and related non-process industries allocated production is calculated to account for 43/0 of the Andean Pact's value-added in these sectors in 1990. For Bolivia and Ecuador the corresponding figure Is above 90 %. Cf. Vaitsos, Crisis, op. cit., p. 762. ;6 Cf. Ffrench-Davis, op. cit., p. 178. 
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Second expanded ediUon
For several years the presentation of African conditions has been blatantly superficial even in scientific publications. It is the alien mode of thinking and behaviour of black Africans that in general is completely ignored or depicted Incompletely or distortedly. After the first edition of this book was taken up already after one year, still another expert in development policy has been retained as author for the second edition, expanded to almost double the former volume. With the present study the authors contribute considerably to debunking the public discussion of the meaning and limits of an Africa-policy doing justice to the white as well as the black world. In negotiating and implementing the SPIDs the Andean planning authorities are facing a complex set of difficult choices and severe constraints. Not only is a workable balance between market and non-market elements to be established so as not to run into too costly economic inefficiencies 19, but opposition by powerful private interest groups must be overcome, which have been for a long time established in one or more of the member countries 20. Furthermore, technological and financial bottlenecks must be widened. If the industrial programming is to get ahead according to the schedules $ 33 bn are needed 21
Apparently, this sum cannot be raised on the domestic capital markets nor is the basic technological infrastructure in the subregion developed sufficiently to carry out the ambitious industrial projects. As a consequence, the Andean countries must to a considerable extent rely on capital and technology from abroad, including direct investments by transnational corporations.
It is, however, not intended to maximize foreign factor inflows, but to attract them under conditions, which in general secure a more balanced distribution of benefits between investors and host ]7 The reservations are made in spite of impressing figures presented by the Ecuadorean Ministry of Industry, according to which 40000 cars and 16000 light trucks will be assembled by 1985 apart from engines, gear boxes, fuel pumps and other parts, the country will save $ 50 mn in vehicle imports and earn $ 250 mn in exports, and 50000 new jobs witl be created in plants located away from the urban centers. Cf. Latin America Economic R e p o r t, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1979, pp. 100, 101. 18 Cf. Bank of London and South America, Review, Vol. 12, No. 12, 1978, pp. 670, 671. }9 The Andean Pact chose a pragmatic approach to achieve a balance between market and planning: the decision of where to invest is taken away from the market, but it is accompanied by a more decentralized decision of how much, when, end how to produce. Cf. Ffrench-Davis, op. cit., p. 177.
countries than has been experienced in the past in many cases, and in particular guarantee that the gains of integration are not enjoyed overproportionately by foreign-based firms.
To a good deal, the unsatisfactory developmental performance of direct foreign investment observed in the fifties and sixties 22 may be attributed to a weak bargaining position vis-a-vis foreign companies. The Andean countries had to offer only limited markets and were facing inter-country competition in attracting foreign capital. Moreover investment policies were subject to frequent and substantial modifications in connection with general political reorientations. As a result foreign companies predominantly engaged themselves in investment projects with short payback periods.
The above considerations suggest, that foreign capital flows might be stimulated and at the same time directed in accordance with the receiving countries interests and priorities, if inter-country competition were abolished, integrated markets created and international rules established, which are less sensitive to national political changes.
Based on this reasoning, the Andean states agreed upon a common code on foreign capital and technology, whose implementation started in June 1971.
Common Treatment of Foreign Investment
The Andean Code goes far beyond regulations applied in most other LDCs in that it pertains not only to balance-of-payments transactions, but touches upon almost the whole range of foreigninvestment aspects relevant to economic development.
The main rules are contained in Decision 24, which was adopted by the Andean Pact Commission on December 31, 1970 and subsequently modified several times though its basic nature did not change 23. With regard to economic integration among the member states the most im- Vol. 6, 1978, pp. 447-459. 25 Apart from Decision 24 and related provisions pertaining exclusively to foreign investment activities, foreign investors are more than national firms also affected by overall policies concerning industrial programming and trade liberalization. It is estimated that in 1974 about one-half of the intraregional exports were made by foreign-owned firms and most of the sectors selected for industrial programming are precisely those in which the foreign share in total output is highest. Cf. V air s o s, Crisis, op. cit., p. 730 and idem, TNE, op. cit., p. 107 Vol. 6, No. 4, 1971, p. 25 . The critical years in Colombia were 1967, 1970, 1972 and 1976 investors, on the other hand, as well as newcomers showed a more flexible attitude 26. As a matter of fact, investment applications decreased in "critical" years, as has been demonstrated for Colombia, which was considered the "weak link in the nationalistic stance of the Andean Pact" 27. In subsequent years, however, the decrease has been more than compensated for by additional applications. To a certain degree this may be explained by apprehensions on the part of US-investors to lose market shares against West-European and Japanese competitors. Inter-company rivalry and the prospects of growing markets appear thus to be stronger than objections against stricter rules of the game. ments flows originating from foreign-owned companies cannot be established, the more so as general political and economic developments may have a stronger influence on foreign investment behaviour than regulations, which are specifically applied to foreign investors.
After almost eight years of implementation the Andean Code on foreign investment has at least proved to be fairly resistant against political changes in the member states. Moreover, the swift adoption of the modifications to Decision 24 following the withdrawal of Chile from the Andean Pact shows a remarkable ability to flexibly adapt provisions to changing circumstances and reveals a considerable extent of agreement on the issue. This contrasts positively to the lengthy negotiations about industrial programming and trade liberalization. The common treatment of foreign capital, therefore, turns out to be the most important contributing factor to the Andean Group's cohesiveness and the viability of the approach to integration chosen by these countries.
INTERNATIONAL DIVISION OF LABOUR
World Trade and Structural Adjustments
by Heinz Werner, Nuremberg *
The developing countries have to be involved more closely in the international division of labour if they are to be able to play their part in a New International Economic Order. Increased competition in semifinished and finished products and internal substitution processes will pose new problems for the industrialized countries and force them to consider structural readjustments in their own economies.
M
ore intensive international division of labour between industrialized and developing countries necessitates more active involvement of the less developed countries in international exchange relations. It poses a multitude of problems relating, for example, to international commodity agreements, development strategies in developing countries (import substitution or export diversification), technology transfer and input, protectionism, financial aid and debt redemption. Many of these questions require the taking of political * Instltut for Arbeltamarkt-und Berufsforschung der Bundesanstalt fQr Arbeit (Institute for Labour Market and Occupational Research of the Federal Institution for Labour).
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decisions with as yet unforeseeable characteristics, dimensions and consequences. The present article therefore attempts no more than to identify currently recognizable tendencies.
The past development of the world trade between industrialized and developing countries is used as a basis for discussion and the background for a consideration of the foreign commerce of the Federal Republic of Germany with the developing countries. This leads to an examination of the possible effects on employment of larger trade exchanges between the Federal Republic and the developing countries insofar as these can be ascertained at present.
